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AND TRIALS 
Lindsay Freeman* 
ABSTRACT 
As technology develops, new tools are continually being 
introduced that alter the nature and availability of courtroom 
evidence. The proliferation, connectivity, and capabilities of camera-
embedded and internet-enabled mobile devices, which record far 
more information about people’s activities and communications than 
ever before, are transforming the way criminal investigators and 
prosecutors collect, evaluate, and present evidence at trial. This is 
particularly true in international criminal trials, where prosecutors 
must present a voluminous and varied body of evidence to prove 
multiple charges related to complex conflicts. It is the prosecutor’s 
job to present evidence in a way that assists the fact-finder in 
evaluating its significance and understanding how it fits into the 
greater narrative. Advanced digital devices can now capture far more 
information about a situation than a witness can perceive, and 
innovative presentation tools allow lawyers to augment and 
strengthen the evidence in their cases by adding supplementary data 
and creating compelling visuals. In cases involving war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, a large quantity and diversity 
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of evidence is necessary to explain the context of the conflict and to 
prove the requisite elements of crimes and modes of liability. By 
examining the evidence and presentation techniques used in recent 
cases before international criminal courts, this article illustrates how 
war crimes prosecutions are evolving to meet the challenges and 
advantages of modern times. Part II explains the applicable law and 
describes how the use of emerging types of evidence in international 
criminal cases has expanded and been refined over the years. Part III 
analyzes three exceptional, yet emblematic cases from 2016, which 
call attention to an important trend that is predictive of the future use 
of digital evidence in war crimes prosecutions. Part IV discusses 
cases on the horizon and what these technological developments 
mean for members of the international justice community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, the four Allied powers—the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France—convened to establish the 
first international military tribunal for Nuremberg, and a new category 
of public international law was born. In the aftermath of World War 
II, international criminal law was created to deal with mass atrocities 
in a global forum. These atrocity crimes were later codified into three 
categories: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.1 
Around the same time, a movement was underway in national 
jurisdictions to increase the use of scientific evidence to solve crimes 
and achieve justice.2 
Due to the nature of the cases at Nuremberg or, more precisely, 
the nature of the Nazi perpetrators as methodical record-keepers, the 
Chief Prosecutor moved away from a reliance primarily on witnesses 
to focus more on documentary evidence.3 The use of science and 
technology to efficiently and systematically wipe out the Jewish 
population was part of the modus operandi of the Nazis. They used 
early IBM computers to track lists of names.4 The very instruments 
the Nazis used to facilitate their crimes, along with other evidence, 
provided a record of information that would later be used to prove 
their guilt. In addition to the large volume of official government and 
                                                 
1. The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court. It was 
adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. Article 5 of the Statute lists the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, which includes the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Also listed is the crime of aggression, but that crime has not yet been 
adopted and therefore will not be discussed in this article. See id. 
2. See generally Joseph Peterson & Ira Sommers, The Role and Impact of Forensic 
Evidence in the Criminal Justice Process, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR99-NEMV] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
3. Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217 (2002).   
4. See generally EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001). 
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military records available in these cases, stacks of photographs and 
hours of film taken by war correspondents were also presented at 
trial.5 War photography went from a tool for government decision-
makers and journalists to an important source of evidence in courts of 
law. 
The Nuremberg trials laid the groundwork for future 
international criminal cases, but it was not until nearly fifty years later 
that the next generation of international criminal tribunals emerged 
with the creation of ad hoc courts for conflicts in the Balkans and 
Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively. These new international 
courts, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”), were established through United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions.6 During this period, the use of more advanced methods 
of forensic science, such as DNA profiling, facilitated by the advent 
of super computers with the capacity to analyze large data sets, 
became widespread within criminal justice systems.7 As forensic 
science developed as an increasingly effective tool for law 
enforcement, military forces were embracing the use of satellites, 
unmanned aerial vehicles and other cutting-edge remote sensing 
technologies for intelligence gathering and combat strategy.8 As the 
ICTY and ICTR cases progressed over two decades, forensic 
anthropology techniques became more precise and satellite imagery 
resolution got sharper. To identify mass graves and to provide before 
and after comparisons of towns destroyed by aerial bombardments, 
ICTY prosecutors introduced satellite imagery procured from the 
United States military as evidence against the perpetrators of the 
Srebrenica massacre.9 Satellite imagery went from an instrument of 
                                                 
5. See generally ERIC STOVER ET AL., HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE PURSUIT OF WAR 
CRIMINALS FROM NUREMBERG TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2016). See also History 
Documentary Films, History Channel documentary Nuremberg Trials World War II 
Documentary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 5. 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5lsb1gjAds.  
6. See S.C. Res. 827,  ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955 ¶ 21 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 
7. Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving – A Judicial and 
Legislative History, FORENSIC MAGAZINE (Jan. 6, 2005). 
8.  Ben Yunmo Wang et al., Problems from Hell, Solution in the Heavens?: Identifying 
Obstacles and Opportunities for Employing Geospatial Technologies to Document and 
Mitigate Mass Atrocities, 2 STABILITY: INT'L J. OF SEC. & DEV. 2-3 (2013).   
9. INT’L BAR ASS’N (IBA) CRIM. COURT PROGRAMME, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC 
TRIALS 24-25 (Aug. 2016). 
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military strategists and private corporations to an important resource 
for war crimes investigators and prosecutors. 
The cases at the ICTY and ICTR also depended to a large extent 
on the testimony of expert witnesses, including scientists, analysts, 
sociologists, psychologists, and historians. The conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda were incredibly complex, both stemming 
from long histories of feuding local populations and political turmoil. 
Unlike Nuremberg, where all the parties involved (and in a sense, the 
whole world) had an intimate knowledge of the conflict and its 
background, the international community (and the international 
judges and lawyers who arrived at the tribunals) did not necessarily 
come with a deep cultural understanding of the people and location in 
which these conflicts took place. As a result, experts who could 
provide proper background information and context played an 
important role in the proceedings. Social experts were used to provide 
background on the historical, cultural, and political context of the 
conflict; legal experts were used to explain intricate and specialized 
areas of the law; and forensic experts were used to describe the 
analytical and scientific methods employed in the field.10 
A decade later came the third wave in the evolution of 
international criminal justice with the establishment of the first 
permanent international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) in The Hague, Netherlands in 2002. At about the same 
time a handful of hybrid or ‘internationalized’ tribunals were set up to 
deal with specific situations in Sierra Leone (2002), Cambodia 
(2003), and Lebanon (2007).11 The birth of these courts coincided 
with the popularization of the internet, particularly social media and 
                                                 
10. See generally Doris Buss, Expert Witnesses and International War Crimes Trials: 
Making Sense of Large-Scale Violence in Rwanda, in NARRATIVES OF JUSTICE IN AND OUT OF 
THE COURTROOM (Dubravka Zarkov & Marlies Glasius eds., 2014); Patricia M. Wald, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations 
on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 87, 101 & 108.  
(2001).  
11.  See UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 
2002 establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter “SCSL”); Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia), as 
amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004) (unofficial translation) establishing the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter “ECCC”); Statute of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S/RES/1757 (2007), establishing the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (hereinafter “STL”); see also CRYER, R. ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 181-90 (3d ed. 2014). 
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other interactive web services, the proliferation of cellular phones and 
other mobile devices outfitted with cameras and global positioning 
systems, and the rise and spread of drone technologies.12 In the span 
of only a couple decades, technologies that were once held solely in 
the domain of governments and militaries became more affordable 
and, as a result, more accessible to the public.13 With the proliferation 
of these technologies came an overabundance of data. Information 
that once would have disappeared into the ether was recorded and 
stored in our digital history. 
While the early ICC cases relied heavily on witness testimony, 
which proved problematic in ways that will be discussed later in this 
article, there was some limited use of alternative types of evidence. 
The ICC’s initial investigations began in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Uganda. Video evidence was introduced in the first trial, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”), for crimes 
committed during the 2002-2003 conflict in the Ituri Region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.14 In the second trial arising from the 
same conflict, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui (“Katanga and Ngudjolo”), the Prosecution made a belated 
attempt to gather forensic evidence, although much of it was excluded 
due to its late disclosure.15 In Uganda, investigators collected audio-
recordings of radio intercepts between members of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army taken by national authorities. Years later, in 
anticipation of the first trial resulting from the Uganda investigation, 
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (“Ongwen”), which is currently 
underway as of this writing, the Prosecution performed forensic 
                                                 
12. In 2002 the first drone was used; in 2004 the term Web 2.0 was coined to describe 
the emergence of new social networking platforms in the early 2000s. See Digital Trends Staff, 
The history of social networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends
.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ [https://perma.cc/NQ45-4UL8] (archived Jan. 
17, 2018).  
13. For example, portable GPS devices, drones, infrared cameras, telephoto lenses, and 
satellite phones are all items ordinary citizens can purchase over the internet.  See Wang et al., 
supra note 8.  
14. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, ¶ 107, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF [https://perma.cc/7ZNJ-S4NP] (last visited Dec. 29, 
2017). 
15. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1515, Decision on 
the disclosure of evidence material relating to the Prosecutor’s site visit to Bogoro on 28, 29 
and 31 March 2009 (Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Katanga, Decision on the disclosure of 
evidentiary material], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_07212.PDF [https://
perma.cc/TP5M-YYEP] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
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analysis such as audio-enhancement and voice-identification on those 
recordings.16 
However, it was not until after the Trial Chambers issued a few 
critical decisions and admonishments regarding the investigations 
conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”), citing weaknesses 
due to the overreliance on witnesses and under-reliance on other 
forms of evidence, that the OTP developed its internal capacity for 
forensic investigations.17 By 2011, the OTP was significantly better 
equipped to deal with cases in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya, 
where mobile phone use was widespread.18 Many of the videos shown 
during confirmation hearings and trials in those cases were taken with 
mobile digital devices such as cell phone cameras. In more recent 
cases, comprehensive satellite imagery collected from humanitarian 
organizations, private companies, and open source platforms has 
aided investigations in Sudan and Mali, and analysts have extracted 
useful leads in a number of other current investigations from websites 
such as Facebook and YouTube.19 Consequently, the more recent 
cases at the ICC have been significantly stronger from an evidentiary 
standpoint than the initial witness-focused cases advanced by the 
Prosecution. In the last few years, telecommunications data, such as 
call data records, cell site maps, and telephone intercepts, as well as 
                                                 
16. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15-533, Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief, 
¶ 80  (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_06511.PDF [https://
perma.cc/WT4G-4Z5B] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
17. See generally Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Ngudjolo, Judgment], 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02993.PDF [https://perma.cc/3AQJ-SM6J] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017) (acquitting on all charges); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the confirmation of charges (Dec. 16, 2011), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_22538.PDF [https://perma.cc/B4DJ-85FB] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017) (declining to confirm the charges); Prosecutor v. Garda, Case No. 
ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Public Redacted Version Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
(Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Garda, Decision on Confirmation of Charges], https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_00753.PDF [https://perma.cc/BH3C-8RUB] (archived Dec. 29, 
2017) (declining to confirm the charges). 
18. See U.C. BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL 
FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 5 (Feb. 2014); see also IBA, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC 
TRIALS, supra note 9. 
19. Humanitarian efforts to collect and analyze satellite imagery of atrocities in Darfur, 
Sudan include the Satellite Sentinel Project, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s 
“Crisis in Darfur” Project in partnership with Google Earth, and Amnesty International’s 
“Decode Darfur” Project. 
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emails, social media posts, and records of financial transactions have 
all been used to further investigations, corroborate witness testimony, 
and strengthen prosecutions at the ICC. Digital information from 
user-generated online content, consumer data from communications 
service providers, and geolocation data are quickly becoming 
essential tools of the trade for international criminal investigators. 
In order to demonstrate how newer types of digital and 
technologically derived evidence have been used, this article 
examines three recent international criminal cases: The Prosecutor v. 
Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Habib Merhi, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra (“Ayyash et al”);20 
The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (“Al Mahdi”);21 and The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido (“Bemba et al”).22 All three cases are, in their own 
way, unique and precedent setting, particularly with regard to the use 
of digital evidence.23 In Ayyash et al, the defendants are the first 
before an internationalized tribunal to be charged with the crime of 
terrorism and are the first in recent history to be tried in absentia. In 
Al Mahdi, the accused is the first ICC defendant to be charged with 
the destruction of cultural heritage as a war crime and the first to 
plead guilty at the ICC. In Bemba et al, the defendants are the first to 
be charged with offenses against the administration of justice for 
interfering with witnesses in another ICC trial pursuant to Article 70 
of the Rome Statute. In each case, the Prosecution relied on digital 
evidence in ways not previously seen in international proceedings. 
These cases illustrate how the types of evidence before international 
criminal courts are changing.  Further, the decisions in these cases 
will serve as precedent (both persuasive and/or binding, depending on 
the jurisdiction) and thus contribute to the emerging jurisprudence on 
digital evidence for future mass atrocity cases. 
                                                 
20. Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
[Spec. Trib. Leb.], https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01.  
21. Prosecutor v. al Madhi, Case ICC-01/12-01/15, https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-
mahdi [https://perma.cc/9Z96-373H] (last visited Dec. 29, 2017).  
22. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case ICC-01/05-01/13, https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba 
[https://perma.cc/5VSL-QXRX] (last visited Dec. 29, 2017). 
23. Digital evidence is “data . . . that is created, manipulated, stored or communicated by 
any device, computer or computer system or transmitted over a communication system, that is 
relevant to the proceedings.” BRIT. INST. OF INT’L AND COMP. L., INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE xxxv (Stephen Mason ed., 2008). 
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
The law of evidence encompasses the rules and legal principles 
that govern the proof of facts in legal proceedings. In criminal cases, 
evidence law is designed to ensure that the rights of witnesses, 
suspects, and the accused are protected through the following of 
proper procedures.24 The overriding purpose of evidentiary and 
procedural rules is to ensure that trials meet fundamental standards of 
fairness and justice. 25 For proceedings before international criminal 
courts, the applicable rules are derived from the founding instruments, 
as well as the case law and other relevant sources of international law. 
There are no uniform rules of procedure and evidence in international 
criminal law, since the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals have taken varied 
approaches. However, despite variations among these rules and 
procedures, certain common principles have emerged. Those common 
principles were incorporated into the formation of the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, which serve as the main legal reference in 
this article.26 
At the international level, the already complex laws of evidence 
are further complicated by the differences in approaches to fact-
finding and evidence across disparate legal traditions.27 All 
international and internationalized criminal tribunals have taken, to 
varying degrees, a hybrid approach to institutional design and the 
rules of evidence and procedure, pulling features from both common 
and civil law systems.28 The applicable law may be difficult to 
ascertain since pertinent rules are scattered throughout multiple 
                                                 
24. See generally Helen Brady, The System of Evidence in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 279 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999); see also  
PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231 (Karim A. A. Khan et 
al. eds., 2010). 
25. KATRINA E. ANDERSON ET AL., THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 82 (John Ciorciari 
ed., 2006). 
26. See generally IBA, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS, supra note 9.   
27. Common law is an adversarial system with the judge acting as referee, whereas civil 
law is an inquisitorial system with the judge acting as an investigator. See generally Geoffrey 
C. Hazard Jr. & Angelo Dondi, Responsibilities of Judges and Advocates in Civil and Common 
Law: Some Lingering Misconceptions Concerning Civil Lawsuits, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 59 
(2006). 
28. See generally Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil 
Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083 (2008). 
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sources.29 Significantly, the founding instruments for international 
courts tend to lack specificity on the rules of evidence, leaving 
substantial discretion to the judges. Evidentiary standards in 
international criminal law are generally more permissive than 
common law jurisdictions since there are no juries.30 Further, 
international criminal courts and tribunals have mixed benches 
(judges from both legal traditions), which makes their decisions 
difficult to predict. 
As a general rule, principles of evidence may be understood to 
fall into one of three broad categories, “power-based rules,” “rights-
based rules,” and “procedural rules.”31 “Power-based rules” define the 
prosecutor’s authority to collect evidence or to request State 
authorities to collect evidence on their behalf. “Rights-based rules” 
require the prosecutor to accord certain privileges to suspects and 
witnesses during interviews and when collecting physical and 
documentary evidence. “Procedural rules” govern the techniques the 
prosecutor can use to gather and preserve evidence, such as the need 
to record interviews or maintain a chain of custody for physical items. 
International judges have broad discretion on deciding the 
consequences for violating any one of these rules, but a serious 
violation of any of these rules could potentially lead to the exclusion 
of evidence at trial. 
In proceedings before the International Criminal Court evidence 
is vetted in three stages: (1) submission or identification; (2) 
admission; and (3) determination of weight. All items of evidence 
will be submitted, which means marked on the record before being 
officially admitted, unless they are prima facie unreliable.32 The 
Chambers have discretion to decide when they want to make a 
determination on the admissibility of the evidence – they can do it 
during trial as the evidence is presented by the parties or wait until 
                                                 
29.  Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 232 (Karim A. A. Khan et al. eds., 2010); see generally 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
ROME STATUTE (2010). 
30. Brady, The System of Evidence, supra note 24, at 286. 
31. Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231 (Karim A. A. Khan et al. eds., 2010). 
32. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 OA 5 OA 6, Judgment on the 
appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial 
Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission into evidence of materials contained in the 
prosecution’s list of evidence” (May 3, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx
?uri=1066048. 
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their final judgment.33 The majority of Chambers have opted for the 
latter. Thus, when the parties close their cases, they do not know 
which items of evidence will be admitted and which, if any, will be 
excluded. Exclusion of evidence is infrequent since international 
judges have shown a preference to admit an item of evidence, but 
may nevertheless choose to give it little or no weight. There has, 
however, in recent years, been a notable increase in the exclusion of 
evidence, particularly for items of new media that have not been 
properly sourced.34 While most Chambers choose to rule on 
admissibility in the final judgment, a few Chambers have made 
exceptions for certain items of evidence. Such exceptions have 
occurred when digital evidence is involved and it is central to the 
Prosecution’s case. For example, in Bemba et al, despite its decision 
to wait until the final judgment to rule on admissibility, the Trial 
Chamber made an exception for items of evidence such as call data 
records, telephone intercepts by Dutch authorities, and financial 
records emanating from Western Union, since these newer types of 
evidence were unprecedented at the ICC.35 Similarly, in Ayyash et al 
at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the judges have made multiple 
interlocutory rulings on the admissibility of telecommunications 
evidence early on in the proceedings. 
                                                 
33. Id. at ¶ 37. “The Trial Chamber has the power to rule or not on relevance or 
admissibility when evidence is submitted to the Chamber.” Id. Accordingly, it may decide 
either (i) to make the ruling on relevance and/or admissibility of the evidence at the time of its 
submission and defer the determination of its probative value to the end of the trial, or (ii) to 
defer this ruling to the end of the proceedings, making it ‘part of its assessment of the evidence 
when it is evaluating the guilt or innocence of the accused person.’” Id. 
34. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ayyash, STL-11-01, Decision on the Admissibility of 
Documents Published on the Wikileaks Website (Spec. Trib. Leb., May 21, 2015) [hereinafter 
Ayyash, Wikileaks Documents Decision], https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-
01/main/filings/orders-and-decisions/trial-chamber/4031-f1955; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-2299-Red, Decision on the admission into evidence of items 
deferred in the Chamber’s “Decision of the Prosecution’s Application for Admission of 
Materials into Evidence Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Rome Statute” (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1609724 [https://perma.cc/KN2C-Y3QM] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017).  
35. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13-1854, Decision on Requests to 
Exclude Western Union Documents and other Evidence Pursuant to Article 69(7), (Apr. 29, 
2016) [hereinafter Bemba, Decision to Exclude Western Union Documents], https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/05-01/13-1854 [https://perma.cc/WC4G-6RLR] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017); Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13-1855, Decision on 
Requests to Exclude Dutch Intercepts and Call Data Records (Apr. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 
Bemba Decision on Requests to Exclude Dutch Intercepts], https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/05-01/13-1855 [https://perma.cc/4MY2-8ZRM] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
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The main rules governing the admissibility of evidence before 
the ICC are Rule 64 of the Rules and Article 69 of the Statute. In 
particular, Article 69(4) states, “[t]he Court may rule on the relevance 
or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the 
probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence 
may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a 
witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”36 
Thus, for any tendered item to be admitted into evidence, it must 
satisfy a three-part admissibility test. Under this test, the Chamber 
will examine whether the submitted materials (1) are relevant to the 
case; (2) have probative value; and (3) are sufficiently relevant and 
probative to outweigh any prejudicial effect that could be caused by 
their admission.37 
The exclusion of evidence is provided for in Article 69(7) of the 
Statute, which states that the Chamber must first consider whether the 
evidence was collected in violation of the Court’s statutory scheme or 
internationally recognized human rights. If such a violation has 
occurred, the Chamber must then consider whether this violation 
“casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence” or whether 
the admission of the evidence “would be antithetical to and would 
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.”38 While this 
seems to dictate mandatory exclusion of evidence, in practice the 
judges have broad discretion on how this provision is applied.39 
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, “the judges have the discretion 
to seek an appropriate balance between the statute’s fundamental 
                                                 
36. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(4), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
37. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-2299-Red, Public Redacted 
Version of “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Admission of Materials into 
Evidence Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Rome Statute,” ¶ 7 (Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter 
Bemba, Public Redacted Version of Admission of Materials into Evidence] https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/05-01/08-2012-Red [https://perma.cc/PCW8-
MNFA] (archived Dec. 29, 2017) (citing Prosecutor v. Bemba, First decision on the 
prosecution and defense requests for the admission of evidence, ¶ 13 (Dec. 15, 2011)). 
38. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(7), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
39. K.M. PITCHER, JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, University of Amsterdam at 543-44 “[Article 69(7) 
of the ICC Statute] provide[s] for an exclusionary discretion, whereby the determination  to be 
made thereunder is a matter of fact and degree, entailing consideration of the particular 
circumstances of the case . . . .”  
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values in each concrete case.”40 The only internationally recognized 
human right defined in ICC case law to date is the internationally 
recognized right to privacy. 
Evidence can be characterized in a number of ways.41  However, 
most evidence law textbooks identify four general categories of 
evidence: testimonial, documentary, physical, and forensic.42 While 
all evidence, regardless of category, goes through the same three-part 
test for admissibility, the determination of weight is more nuanced. 
The Chamber’s assessment of the weight to be attributed to any item 
of evidence depends on the type of evidence. The Chamber will 
identify each item of evidence either as direct or indirect, the latter 
encompassing hearsay evidence.43 Direct evidence provides first-hand 
information that supports the truth of an assertion. 44 By contrast, 
indirect or circumstantial evidence requires an inference to connect 
the evidence to a conclusion of fact. The Chambers have stated that 
direct evidence has higher probative value than circumstantial 
evidence, which is of low probative value, although under the rules of 
the Court, circumstantial evidence is accepted.45 
The assessment as to how much weight to give an item of 
evidence will also vary based on the category of evidence. To assess 
testimonial evidence, the Court will evaluate the credibility of the 
witness and the reliability of his or her testimony. When evaluating 
                                                 
40. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 84 (Feb. 7, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=266175.  
41. Evidence may be testimonial, documentary, physical or forensic; scientific, digital or 
electronic; lay witness or expert; direct, indirect or circumstantial; hearsay; corroborative or 
conclusive; demonstrative; statistical; character; contextual; incriminating or exculpatory; or 
crime base or linkage.  
42. Some people choose to look at physical and forensic evidence in one category. I have 
chosen to separate it here. 
43. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 82 (Jan. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Muthaura et al., 
Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF. 
44. Id. at ¶ 83. 
45. “Nothing in the statutory framework prevents the Chamber from relying on 
circumstantial evidence.” See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 39 (Mar. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Bemba, 
Judgment], https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/05-01/08-3343. Note: 
This is a slightly different approach than some national jurisdictions. For example, California 
Jury Instruction states that “Both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable types of 
evidence to prove or disprove the elements of a charge, including intent and mental state and 
acts necessary to a conviction, and neither is necessarily more reliable than the other. Neither 
is entitled to any greater weight than the other.” CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 223 (CALCRIM 2017). 
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the oral testimony of a witness, the Chamber will consider “the 
entirety of the witness’s account; the manner in which he or she gave 
evidence; the plausibility of the testimony; and the extent to which it 
was consistent, including as regards other evidence in the case.”46 The 
Chamber will evaluate the extent and seriousness of the inconsistency 
and its impact on the overall reliability of the witness.47 When 
assessing the testimony of expert witnesses, the Chamber considers 
factors such as “the established competence of the particular witness 
in his or her field of expertise, the methodologies used, the extent to 
which the findings were consistent with other evidence in the case 
and the general reliability of the expert’s evidence.”48 
To assess documentary evidence, on the other hand, the 
Chamber will examine its “provenance, source or author, as well as 
their role in the relevant events, the chain of custody from the time of 
the item’s creation until its submission to the Chamber, and any other 
relevant information.”49 The Chambers have explained that the 
burden of proof of the reliability of a document lies on the party 
seeking its admission.50 If a document is determined to be authentic, it 
means it is what it purports to be, which is different from the 
determination as to whether its contents are reliable. It is important to 
note that a document may be authentic but nevertheless unreliable.51 
There is no strict requirement that every document be authenticated 
officially or by a witness in court.52 The Chambers have explained 
that: 
                                                 
46. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 102 (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment], 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF [https://perma.cc/5P9G-7W5C] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
47. Id. at ¶ 102. 
48. Id. at ¶ 112. 
49. Bemba, Judgment, at ¶ 247. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Documents may be admitted by the parties through a “bar table” motion, which 
provides for the situation where documents or other material are put into evidence directly, 
without being produced by or through a witness in the course of testimony. See generally 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2290, Prosecution’s Submission of Material 
as Evidence from the Bar Table Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Statute (July 16, 2010), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=909643 [https://perma.cc/BBQ7-F5W6] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017). The “procedure of tendering materials from the bar table without it 
being introduced by a witness has been accepted by all the Trial Chambers” at the Court. 
Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-1219-Red, Public redacted version of 
the “Joint Defence Application for the Admission of Items related to the Testimony of P-0536 
from the Bar Table,” ICC-01/09-01/11-1219-Conf, 13 March 2014 536, ¶ 7 (July 6, 2016), 
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items can also be (i) self-authenticating, if they are official 
documents publicly available from official sources; (ii) agreed 
upon by the parties as authentic; (iii) prima facie reliable if they 
bear sufficient indicia of reliability such as a logo, letter head, 
signature, date or stamp, and appear to have been produced in the 
ordinary course of the activities of the persons or organisations 
who created them; or (iv) in case the item itself does not bear 
sufficient indicia of reliability, shown to be authentic and reliable 
by the tendering party through provision of sufficient information 
to enable the Chamber to verify that the documents are what they 
purport to be.53 
Digital evidence is “information and data of value to an 
investigation that is stored on, received, or transmitted by an 
electronic device.”54 Most digital evidence is considered documentary 
or forensic evidence, depending on whether any analysis or scientific 
procedure has been applied in order to validate or verify the digital 
item. Digital photographs, aerial and satellite images, digital audio- 
and video-recordings, call records, emails and other electronic 
communications or records are considered documentary evidence and 
are therefore evaluated based on the same criteria as paper 
documents. If forensic processes have been applied to digital 
information (i.e., audio enhancement or photograph augmentation) 
or an analytic product or expert report has been compiled using raw 
digital data (i.e., a geolocated photograph or call sequence table) that 
evidence may have to be introduced through an expert witness, which 
would require additional conditions to be met. Analytical products 
that are introduced as evidence should be distinguished from 
demonstrative evidence, such as visual representations or models, 
which are technically not evidence at all. 
Based on the limited jurisprudence available to date, digital 
evidence may be excluded if its collection violated the Statute or an 
internationally recognized human right, such as the right to privacy, 
and digital evidence may be given little weight if the judges do not 
understand its significance or if it cannot be properly sourced or 
authenticated. While the overarching principles of how digital 
                                                                                                             
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04873.PDF [https://perma.cc/M7VQ-4V4E] 
(archived Jan. 17, 2018).  
53. Bemba, Public Redacted Version of Admission of Materials into Evidence, at ¶ 9. 
54. ARIC W. DUTELLE, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION 374 
(2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS 72 (2007).  
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evidence will be evaluated are known, decisions are made on a case-
by-case basis and there is still minimal guidance on how the 
Chambers will rule based on different sets of facts. To better 
understand the applicable rules and principles, the following Section 
discusses the most relevant jurisprudence on digital and 
technologically derived evidence in international criminal cases. 
A. The evolution of evidence in international criminal trials 
While, over many decades, national criminal trials have 
gradually evolved from cases based exclusively on the testimony of 
eyewitnesses to incorporating documentary and physical evidence, 
international criminal trials have been exceptional with a diverse body 
of evidence from the beginning because of the unique nature of the 
institutions, the perpetrators, and the crimes themselves. In order to 
understand the evidence and its significance in international criminal 
cases, the parties and judges need considerable background 
information and context on the historical, cultural, and political nature 
of the conflict. Thus, technologically derived evidence and innovative 
methods of evidence collection, preservation, and presentation have 
been an integral part of the international criminal justice story from 
start. 
In addition to being the first court of its kind, the International 
Military Tribunal for Nuremberg was remarkable in a number of other 
ways. The cases were striking because of the large volume of 
documentary evidence, particularly official government and military 
records, Third Reich propaganda and public campaigns, and 
photographs and film produced by journalists covering the war, which 
were all used to prove the Nazi’s organizational hierarchy, chain of 
command, and genocidal intent, as well as other criminal elements.55 
When facing the challenge of the first international military 
prosecution, the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Justice Robert 
Jackson, had concerns about a shortage of evidence.56 Those fears 
were quickly laid to rest when a mountain of evidence arrived and he 
                                                 
55. See generally WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT 
NUREMBERG (Barnes & Nobel Inc. eds., 1995). 
56. History.com Staff, Nuremberg Trials, HISTORY.COM (2010), 
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/nuremberg-trials [https://perma.cc/77D3-V8K5] 
(archived Dec. 29, 2017); see generally History Documentary Films, History Channel 
Documentary Nuremberg Trials World War II Documentary (Jan. 5, 2016), YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5lsb1gjAds&t=5s.  
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realized that the Nazi defendants, consistent with German cultural 
norms and practice in general, were orderly, fastidious record-keepers 
who documented every action they took and officially stamped each 
document.57 Justice Jackson decided, against common wisdom, to 
switch his prosecution away from witnesses to what he referred to as 
a “documentation trial.”58 One person who opposed this approach was 
General William Donovan, Head of the Office of Strategic Services 
during the war and a member of the trial staff. General Donovan 
believed that the trial would not have a great enough impact unless 
there were live witnesses on the stand being interrogated. Live 
testimony was necessary to capture public attention. In rejecting this 
approach, Justice Jackson demonstrated an important truth: that 
despite the grave and horrific nature of the crimes, a criminal case 
could be successful based on cold, hard facts and evidence rather than 
relying on the sympathetic testimony of victims to capitalize on 
human empathy as a response to atrocities. He presented a case that 
allowed for a decision based on reason, not emotion. 
In addition to the large amounts of government and military 
records that served as evidence, photographs and film also played a 
significant role.59 For over a century, war crime reporting through the 
use of photography and, more recently, film had developed as a way 
of educating government decision-makers and informing the public 
about war efforts abroad.60 World War II was a large-scale, important 
global conflict and, as such, was well documented. With the creation 
of Nuremberg, war documentation found a new application as 
evidence in war crimes prosecutions. The large scale of the conflict 
and the amount of people it touched meant far more witnesses to the 
events than could ever actually be presented during a trial, especially 
one that was mandated to be expeditious. The abundance of evidence 
forced the prosecutors to make choices about which victims and 
witnesses to put on the stand, and gave them freedom and creativity in 
                                                 
57. See History Documentary Films, supra note 56 at 14:05 (“47 crates of binders, 3,000 
pounds of Nazi party records, tons of diplomatic papers, 12 volumes of secret foreign policy 
conference records and miles of film poured in.”).  
58. See id. 
59. Evidence from the Holocaust: How we know what we know, UNITED STATES 
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId
=10007147 [https://perma.cc/K49T-AGDU] (last visited Dec. 29, 2017). 
60. See generally JASON FRANCISCO, War Photography, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TWENTIETH CENTURY PHOTOGRAPHY 1636 (Lynne Warren ed., Routledge, 2005). 
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their approach to presenting evidence, educating the fact-finder, and 
telling the story. 
Along with the advantages that came with trying cases based on 
a global event of this magnitude, there were a host of challenges that 
came with wielding justice on this scale and in an international 
environment. An obvious problem that arises immediately in an 
international trial is that the various participants will speak different 
languages and evidence may require cultural knowledge and 
interpretation to properly understand it. At Nuremberg the defense 
counsel and their clients spoke German, while the four judges and 
prosecution teams representing the Allied powers spoke English, 
Russian, or French.61 The tribunal had a mandate to provide “fair and 
expeditious” proceedings.62 To be fair, the accused had to be 
questioned in their native language, but to be expeditious, the Court 
could not rely on the existing technology of consecutive translation 
into all four languages. To solve this problem, the Head of 
interpreting systems at Nuremberg, Col. Leon Dostert, consulted with 
an old friend, Thomas Watson Sr., the CEO of IBM.63 IBM offered to 
test out a new technology it had been working on and developed a 
system of microphones and headsets to transmit the cacophony of 
languages in real time.64 Thus, simultaneous interpretation, which is 
still used today, was invented specifically for the Nuremberg Trials.65 
This partnership between IBM and the Nuremberg tribunal would be 
the first in a history of collaboration between technologists and 
                                                 
61. The Allied powers were English, American, Soviet and French and each had one 
judge and one prosecution team. See Roman A. Matasov, Nuremberg: The Trial of Six Million 
Words, AIIC, https://aiic.net/page/7943/ [https://perma.cc/WFK4-FPU7] (last visited Jan. 22, 
2018).  
62. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 727, 729, 735-
36 (1999). 
63. See generally Catherine Pilishvili & Charlotte Kelly, Chief Interpreter at Nuremberg 
Trials Leaves His Mark on Georgetown, SFS.GEORGETOWN.EDU (Nov. 2016), 
https://sfs.georgetown.edu/chief-interpreter-nuremberg-trials-leaves-mark-georgetown/ 
[https://perma.cc/6WGS-ZHLT] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
64. Even before the Nuremberg trials were over, Dostert had taken his system to the 
United Nations in New York. It is the same model used today. While technology has not yet 
replaced the interpreters themselves, one day it might. In the last year, multiple universal 
translation devices have come on the market such as Babelfish and Sigmo. See generally 
Pilishvili & Kelly, supra note 63.   
65. Nina Porzucki, How the Nuremberg Trials Changed Interpretation Forever, 
PRI.ORG  (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-29/how-do-all-those-leaders-
un-communicate-all-those-languages [https://perma.cc/7XQ4-NXD6] (archived Dec. 29, 
2017). 
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international criminal justice professionals to solve problems unique 
to prosecuting cases of this magnitude in the international arena. 
The second international criminal justice wave came in the early 
1990s with the ICTY and ICTR. While witness and victim testimony 
was a significant part of the cases before both tribunals, non-oral 
evidence such as satellite imagery, forensic anthropology and expert 
reports, and radio broadcasts were offered as evidence. ICTR 
prosecutors pioneered the use of new forms of evidence to support 
innovative charges in what is now considered the landmark “media 
case,” Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al.66 In this case, the Prosecution 
introduced radio broadcasts as evidence to support the charge of 
inciting genocide by encouraging violence through the public 
airwaves. Three individuals were convicted for incitement of 
genocide based primarily on recordings of radio broadcasts through 
which one of the accused incited violence against the Tutsi 
population. While radio itself was not new, more recent technology 
allowed for the availability of these recordings years after the 
broadcast made the case possible. They may not have been preserved 
as evidence without advancements in electronics that expanded data 
storage capacity.67 It is also interesting to note that, just as in the 
Nuremberg trials, it was the tools utilized by the Accused that 
produced the best evidence of their criminal intent. 
At the ICTY, aerial images offered by the Prosecution were 
admitted to show areas of disturbed earth that represented mass 
graves in the cases of Krstić, Blagojević, Popović et al and Tolimir.68 
                                                 
66. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 
2003), http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/ictr-99-52 [https://perma.cc/33RR-QZT8] (archived 
Dec. 29, 2017); see UNITED NATIONS, MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, Nahimana et al. (Media case) (ICTR-99-52) (describing Nahimana et al. as the 
“media case”).  
67. Zetta Staff, History of Data Storage Technology, ZETTA.NET (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.zetta.net/about/blog/history-data-storage-technology [https://perma.cc/K8CK-
XE5W] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
68. Prosecutor v Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 65, 67–68, 70, 435, 
454, 457, 478, 561, 564 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Fmr. Yugo. Dec. 12. 2012), 
http://www.icty.org/case/tolimir/4 [https://perma.cc/6DTJ-YMLJ] (archived Dec. 29, 2017); 
Prosecutor v Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Public Redacted Judgment, Volume I ¶¶ 73-
75, (Int’l Crim. Trib for Fmr. Yugo. June 10, 2010), http://www.icty.org/case/popovic/4 
[https://perma.cc/SZ6L-SV68] (archived Dec. 29, 2017); Prosecutor v Blagojević , Case No. 
IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, n. 1397, 1398 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Fmr. Yugo. Jan 17, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/case/blagojevic_jokic/4 [https://perma.cc/C4SC-9HRC] (archived Dec. 
29, 2017); Prosecutor v Krstić , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 114, 223, 229, 230, 
238, 250, 253, 258 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Fmr. Yugo. Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/
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The aerial images, which had been provided to the prosecution by the 
US government, also showed buildings, vehicles, large groups of 
prisoners and bodies which corroborated the testimony of witnesses 
and assisted the judges in comprehending relevant geographical 
relationships such as the proximity of the mass graves to Srebrenica.69 
The US government’s stipulation on providing this information was 
that the sources and methods used to collect these digital images 
could not be discussed in the courtroom.70 In response to the 
defense’s objections, the Trial Chamber explained that without 
evidence to challenge the reliability of the images, they would not be 
excluded.71 This ruling remains significant today, since it places a 
burden on the Defense to make a showing that digital images lack 
reliability or are not authentic before allowing them to challenge the 
admissibility of the evidence on those grounds. 
The first ICC Prosecutor’s approach to cases diverged from his 
predecessors at the ICTY and ICTR in that the early cases were 
eyewitness-focused and relied almost entirely on testimonial 
evidence. In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the first trial before the ICC, the 
Prosecution introduced evidence in oral, written and audio-visual 
form. There was no physical or forensic evidence.72 The evidence 
included testimony from sixty-seven witnesses, only one of whom 
was qualified as an expert.73 Documents and other materials such as 
transcripts of interviews, videos, records from non-governmental 
organizations, letters, photographs and maps were either introduced 
through witnesses or by bar table motion.74 Soon after the trial 
commenced, evidence emerged that some of the witnesses’ 
                                                                                                             
case/krstic/4 [https://perma.cc/FG5W-WPRP] (archived Dec. 29, 2017); IBA, EVIDENCE 
MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS, supra note 9.  
69. Aerial imagery released by United States military intelligence has now also been 
used at the ICTY in criminal trials of members of the Bosnian Serb Army including Radislav 
Krstic and, most recently, the ongoing case against Ratko Mladic. These images were used to 
corroborate witness accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out in 1995 
by identifying areas of disturbed earth indicating the presence of mass graves and by noting 
the presence of large groups of people and the vehicles witnesses described as those used to 
transport the victims. See generally IBA, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS, supra note 9. 
70. See generally Tolimir, Judgment; IBA, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS, supra 
note 9. 
71. Tolimir, Judgment, ¶ 69. 
72. Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 93. 
73. Id. The expert was a psychologist called by the Chamber to give testimony on the 
psychological impact of a child having been a soldier and the effect of trauma on member. See 
Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 105. 
74. Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 93. 
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testimonies had been tainted by the influence of corrupt 
intermediaries.75 In particular, a recurring issue was whether some of 
the intermediaries used by the Prosecution encouraged witnesses to 
lie about their ages.76 Lubanga was charged with the war crime of 
using, conscripting or enlisting child soldiers, and so the Prosecutor 
had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that “the perpetrator 
conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed 
forces or used one or more persons to participate actively in 
hostilities” and that “such person or persons were under the age of 15 
years.”77 Thus, lies about the age of alleged child soldiers were 
material to the case. While the testimony of the nine witnesses was 
admitted, the judges attributed almost no weight in their final 
decision.78 Ultimately, the Chamber found the testimony of nine 
prosecution witnesses, all alleged child soldiers, unreliable because of 
witness coaching.79 
The conditions under which the investigators were operating in 
the Ituri region made it difficult to establish the age of the witnesses.80 
For the security of the alleged child soldiers, the investigators chose 
not speak to family members or members of the community, and 
could not easily access school records. The Chamber found that the 
Prosecution’s failure to investigate the children’s histories 
significantly undermined its case.81 To support the charge despite the 
witnesses’ lack of credibility, the Prosecution introduced video 
footage portraying Lubanga inspecting troops who appeared to be 
under the age of fifteen and presented an expert report relating to X-
ray examinations of bones and teeth. Though the probative value of 
these additional pieces of evidence was minimal, they helped 
corroborate aspects of the witness testimony and, as a result, secure a 
conviction.82 
In Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the second trial, which 
came out of the same initial investigation in the Democratic Republic 
                                                 
75. An “Intermediary” is an individual or organization who, upon request of an organ or 
unit of the Court of Counsel, conducts certain activates. See generally INT’L CRIM. CT., ICC 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERMEDIARIES (Mar. 2014). 
76. Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 169. 
77. Int’l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (2011); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (Mar. 14, 2012), ¶¶ 1-8. 
78. See generally Lubanga, Judgment. 
79. See generally Lubanga, Judgment. 
80. Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 70. 
81. Lubanga, Judgment, ¶ 75. 
82. See generally Katanga, Decision on the disclosure of evidentiary material. 
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of Congo, the Prosecution’s case faced similar issues with witness 
credibility and the use of corrupt intermediaries. Therefore, after the 
confirmation hearing, and even after the passage of disclosure 
deadlines, the Prosecution continued its investigation, sending an 
expert mission to examine the ‘Instit de Borogo’ in the Ituri region in 
March 2009, about seven months before the trial was scheduled to 
commence.83 The examinations yielded additional materials which 
the Prosecutor sought to admit as evidence, which included a digital 
360- degree visual representation of the ‘Institut’ with a report by the 
visual technician who created it and over 200 photographs taken by 
drone which were used for its production; a ballistic expert report 
accompanied by video of the crime scene investigation and related 
physical evidence such as shell casings; a forensic report concerning 
blood analysis and blood samples; and a forensic report about the 
exhumation and autopsy of human remains, as well as videos and 
hundreds of photographs of exhumation process and the human 
remains.84 They also sought to add four experts to the witness list: a 
visual technician, a ballistics expert, an expert in morphologic 
analysis of blood traces, and a DNA expert.85 The Prosecution 
justified the late submission, in part, on the security situation which, it 
argued, prevented them from taking these investigative steps earlier. 
The Defense challenged the validity of the Prosecution’s justification 
for not having been able to conduct the examination earlier and 
argued that the complexity of the reports required a counter-expert.86 
In addition, since six years had passed since the alleged events, the 
Defense argued that there were serious concerns about the loss and 
alteration of the physical evidence collected.87 
The Chamber found that the photographic representation could 
assist it in visualizing the ‘Institut’ and its surroundings, but noted 
that it had very limited evidentiary value.88 It also discussed the 
limited probative value of the conclusions in the reports due to the 
degradation of evidence upon which they were based. The Chamber 
                                                 
83. Id. 
84. See generally id. 
85. See generally id. 
86. See id. at ¶¶ 8-9. The Chamber acknowledged that the ballistic report was relevant to 
the case, yet found that it did not offer particularly compelling information to aid it since the 
experts were not able to establish the projectile’s origin or the time it was fired. Similarly, with 
the blood report and exhumation and autopsy report. Id. at ¶¶ 41-45. 
87. See Katanga, Decision on the disclosure of evidentiary material, ¶ 10. 
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concluded that, given the rather limited pertinence of the information 
contained in the reports, it could only allow their late addition if the 
added value of the information outweighed the procedural 
implications to the fair trial rights of the Accused caused by the late 
disclosure.89 The Chamber admitted the visual representation, but 
excluded the rest, acknowledging that while they were relevant, the 
Chamber was not convinced that the expert reports offered 
significantly more compelling evidence than what had been 
previously disclosed. In an interview in 2012, Judge Bruno Cotte, the 
presiding judge in Katanga and Ngudjolo, said that the Prosecution’s 
cases would benefit from diversifying the kinds of evidence it 
presents at trial, noting as well that witness testimonies are “often 
fragile.”90 
Additionally, in its decision, the Chamber admonished the 
Prosecution for selecting and instructing the experts unilaterally 
without properly informing or consulting the Defense. The Chamber 
was of the view that the opposing party should, to the extent possible, 
be invited to participate in the expertise from an early stage onward, 
and that the Defense should be able to comment on the working 
methods of experts.91 The Chamber explained that early involvement 
by all parties prevents them from being caught off-guard by the 
findings: “[t]his unfortunate situation could have been almost entirely 
avoided if the Prosecution had invited the Defense to take part in the 
expert mission to Bogoro from the beginning.”92 It is likely that future 
judges might apply the same standard to complex digital forensics 
analysis as well as physical forensic missions. After the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo judgments, the consideration of conducting forensic 
missions early on has been part of all OTP investigation plans. 
During the arrests of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in 2008 and 
Callixte Mbarushimana in 2010, investigators seized electronic 
hardware such as laptops and cell phones from the Accused.93 
However, the Prosecution did not offer digital evidence from these 
sources in the hearings or at trial. This could be because they did not 
have the capacity and resources to do a thorough digital forensic 
                                                 
89. See id. at ¶ 56. 
90. BERKELEY HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS, supra note 18, at 5 (citing 
Franck Petite, “Interview with ICC judge Bruno Cotte, presiding judge at the second trial at 
the ICC,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 20 June 2012).  
91. Katanga, Decision on the disclosure of evidentiary material, ¶ 68. 
92. Id. at ¶ 74. 
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investigation, or because they did not find relevant material of 
evidentiary value on the devices. The charges against Mbarushimana 
were not confirmed. On the other hand, Bemba was convicted after a 
lengthy trial, although evidence from his computer was not essential 
to the case. Interestingly, in his second trial for witness tampering 
which is discussed in detail in Part III, more digital evidence was 
seized and it did play an important role in building that case against 
him. 
By 2011, the Office of the Prosecutor was investigating cases in 
which digital evidence was critical in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Libya. These new cases generated an increased demand for the 
storage, processing, and analysis of digital evidence. In response, the 
Court began to consider ways to build its cyber forensics capacity.94 
In cases originating from the atrocities committed in Darfur, Sudan, 
satellite imagery has played an important role in tracking the burning 
and destruction of villages, the movement of populations, and the 
location (absence or presence on the tarmac) of Antonovs, the 
aircrafts used by the Government of Sudan. The availability of this 
satellite imagery is, in part, due to the massive efforts and resources 
provided by various humanitarian non-governmental organizations to 
collect this material.95 The Prosecution presented satellite imagery in 
the confirmation of charges hearings for the cases of Prosecutor v. 
Abdallah Banda Saleh Jerbo Jamus and Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss 
Abu Garda, which involved an attack against an African 
Peacekeeping Mission at the Haskanita Military Group Site in 
Darfur.96 The evidence in the other Darfur cases has yet to be 
presented, since the accused are still at large, but it is likely that 
satellite imagery will be an integral part of those cases as well. 
In its tenure from 2002-2015, the ICC Chambers issued three 
trial judgments in the cases of Lubanga, Ngudjolo, and Katanga.97 In 
                                                 
94. Id.; IBA, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS, supra note 9. 
95. The Satellite Sentinel Project, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Amnesty 
International, and the Holocaust Memorial Museum in partnership with Google Earth have all 
worked on initiatives to analyze and utilize satellite images of human rights abuses and war 
crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan. 
96. See generally Prosecutor v. Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, Public 
Redacted Version Corrigendum of the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges” (Mar. 7, 
2011), http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.03.07_Prosecutor_v_Banda.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TF8L-4HEK] (archived Dec. 29, 2017); Garda, Decision on Confirmation of 
Charges. 
97. See generally Lubanga Judgment; Ngudjolo Judgment; and Katanga Judgment.  
Please note that although Katanga and Ngudjolo originated as one case, the cases were later 
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2016, the number of trial judgments doubled with the issuance of 
judgments in Bemba, Al Mahdi, and Bemba et al. These cases, and the 
digital evidence used by the Prosecution to prove the respective 
charges, are examined in the following Part. 
III. RECENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
This Part examines the different types of digital and 
technologically derived evidence offered by the Prosecution in three 
recent cases before international criminal courts. Since international 
criminal justice is still a rather new field of law, most cases deal with 
never before seen sets of facts and unprecedented legal issues. 
Outliers are the norm. Thus, all three case studies below are atypical 
and represent many “firsts” for the field, yet are nevertheless relevant 
because the way in which the judges rule on the admissibility and 
weight of these newer types of evidence will set the standard for 
future cases. The first case involves computer-facilitated analysis of 
an explosion (“digital explosives evidence”) and call data records 
(“telecommunications evidence”). The second case involves images 
from Google Earth and videos from YouTube (“open source 
evidence”) and an interactive platform created from visual 
representations (“interactive digital platform”). The third case 
involves records of wire transfers (“digital financial evidence”), call 
data records and telephone intercepts (“intercepts evidence”), and 
emails and social media posts (“digital communications evidence”). 
A. Evidence of a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts 
The main case before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”), 
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, is one of many firsts for international 
criminal justice, both legally and procedurally.98 The STL is the first 
tribunal of an international character to have jurisdiction over the 
crime of terrorism and is uniquely set up with an independent Defense 
Office responsible for protecting and promoting the rights of the 
accused. It is also the first tribunal in recent history to hold trials with 
                                                                                                             
severed and separate judgments were issues by the Trial Chamber. Ngudjolo was acquitted. 
Katanga was convicted on some charges and acquitted on other charges.  
98. See generally Ayyash, Wikileaks Documents Decision. 
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the defendants in absentia.99 The Prosecution’s case is entirely 
circumstantial with no direct evidence, and includes the first use of 
telecommunications data as evidence. The terrorist attack upon which 
the case is based occurred in Lebanon in 2005 – a place and time 
when cellular phones were widely used and relied upon. The 
investigation began shortly after the attack and continued over many 
years leading to the creation of the STL in 2007 and the issuance of 
an indictment in 2011. The trial opened on January 6, 2014 and is 
ongoing. 
1. Case Background 
On February 14, 2005 at 12:55 p.m., an explosion in front of the 
St. Georges Hotel shook downtown Beirut. The blast destroyed a 
convoy of vehicles carrying the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, 
Rafik Hariri, killing him along with eight members of his entourage 
and 13 bystanders, as well as injuring over 200 others.100 Shortly after 
the attack, two separate investigations commenced. Local police ran 
one investigation, while the other was directed by the United 
Nations.101 The United Nations poured millions of dollars into their 
investigation, focusing on the explosion and forensic evidence 
collected at the scene. While this provided investigators with a clearer 
picture of the events that occurred before, during, and after the attack, 
it did little in the way of identifying those responsible. By contrast, 
one of the local police officers, a young investigator with a computer 
engineering background named Wissam Eid, took a different 
approach: he decided to look at cellphone records.102 At Eid’s request, 
a judge ordered Lebanon’s main cellphone companies, Alfa and MTC 
Touch, to produce records of all calls and text messages in Lebanon 
in the four months preceding the bombing.103 At the time, cell phone 
                                                 
99. Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, Decision to hold trials in absentia, STL-11-01/1/TC, 
R109799.  See generally International Bar Association, Report on the ‘Experts Rountable on 
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evidence had been used infrequently in national jurisdictions, and law 
enforcement officials were less informed about the value of 
information that could be derived from examining cellphone use. Eid 
understood the potential for significant evidence extracted from cell 
phone metadata and meticulously analyzed the records, creating an 
algorithm that revealed a peculiar pattern.104 He noticed that in 
October 2004, just after Hariri resigned, a cluster of cellphones began 
following him everywhere. Eid started with the location data from the 
phone of Hariri and known members of his entourage, and then 
eliminated them to isolate the phones in the same locations that were 
unknown. From plotting the movement of these phones, it was clear 
that Hariri was under constant surveillance by unidentified individuals 
for months preceding the attack. Eid worked backwards to attribute 
the phone numbers and identify their users.105 Soon the investigation 
was blown wide open. As Eid honed in on the suspects, the United 
Nations took note of his work, eventually incorporating his methods 
and work product into their own investigation.106 
On May 30, 2007, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1757 to establish the STL to prosecute the individuals responsible for 
committing the February 14 attack in Beirut. The founding instrument 
for the Tribunal specified that it must apply the Lebanese Criminal 
Code for crimes of terrorism, defined as “acts intended to cause a 
state of terror and committed by means liable to create a public 
danger such as explosive devices, inflammable materials, toxic or 
corrosive products and infectious or microbial agents.”107 Despite this 
mandate, the Appeals Chamber issued an interlocutory 
decision holding that it could also apply international law related to 
the definition of terrorism to which Lebanon is bound.108 After years 
                                                                                                             
preclude such a broad request; later the Prosecutor’s Office received additional records for 
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104. Metadata is data about data and includes time stamps, geospatial information, or 
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of investigation, the first indictment was confirmed on June 28, 2011 
in which the four accused were charged with conspiracy to commit a 
terrorist act; committing a terrorist act by using explosive materials; 
premeditated intentional homicide by using explosive materials; and 
attempted premeditated intentional homicide by using explosive 
materials.109 The trial began in January 2014 and, as of 2017, the 
Prosecution was still presenting its case. This is a complex case, so to 
aid the judges, the Prosecution divided its presentation of the 
evidence into three categories: (1) forensic evidence relating to the 
attack; (2) evidence of the preparatory acts of the Accused; and (3) 
the identity and roles of the Accused.110 These categories are 
discussed below. 
2. Digital Explosives Evidence 
The forensic evidence relating to the attack involves DNA 
profiling and analysis of human remains, as well as analysis of trace 
explosive materials and physical evidence such as the remnants of the 
Mitsubishi Canter van used to carry the bomb. Video footage from 
surveillance cameras in the square and surrounding area has been 
used to corroborate the findings of the forensic examinations and to 
establish a clear timeline of events leading up to the attack. During 
the Prosecution’s opening statement, two detailed physical models of 
the square where the attack occurred–one representing the scene 
before the explosion and one representing the destruction afterwards–
were placed in the center of the courtroom. In order to calculate the 
amount of explosives used and to pinpoint where the bomb was 
detonated, the Prosecution presented expert reports and testimony 
from two Argentinian civil engineering professors who used 
specialized computer programming and algorithms to input the data 
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and determine what it would take to cause the damage to the square. 
Explosion reconstruction is not a new science and has been applied in 
national cases, but this is the first time this technology has ever been 
used before an international criminal tribunal. Further, the amount of 
resources and manpower dedicated to this portion of the evidence is 
unprecedented.111 
The experts authored two reports, which presented and analyzed 
several scenarios explaining the size of the crater and the structural 
damage caused to the buildings. The analysis was carried out to 
determine whether the explosives were buried, sitting on the ground 
surface, or at some point above the ground.112 They explained how 
they ascertained the quantity of the explosives as well as their 
location in terms of height above ground of the explosive mass, 
concluding that, given the parameters of the crater, the damage 
observed, measured and numerically modeled could have only been 
created by an above-ground explosion. The reports and testimony 
supported the Prosecution’s theory of the case that the explosion was 
the work of a suicide bomber driving a van carrying explosives, and 
refuted the defense that the blast was caused by an underground 
bomb. 
The amount of data points entered into the calculation and the 
ability to produce different scenarios could not have been done by a 
human being—it required machine intelligence. Thus, while the 
defense may present a counter-expert, it will be very difficult to 
challenge the findings of the computer program without the ability to 
truly understand how the algorithm works.113 The defense cannot 
cross-examine a computer program. In addition to the need for 
specialized knowledge to understand this evidence, the cost of these 
forensic examinations and calculations was incredibly high, posing an 
obstacle to the defense’s ability to effectively counter the 
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Prosecution’s claims. While the case is in progress and, therefore, no 
final judgment has been issued, the questions asked of the witnesses 
by the judges show just how difficult some of the technical aspects of 
the testimony are to grasp. When the testimony is this specialized and 
technical, judges are put in the difficult position of either rejecting it 
because they do not understand it or accepting the conclusions 
without qualification—both dangerous propositions for the interests 
of justice. 
3. Telecommunications Evidence 
The evidence of the preparatory acts of the accused and their 
identity and roles in the plot is based primarily on 
telecommunications evidence, including call data records (“CDRs”), 
cell site information, and subscriber records provided by 
Communication Service Providers (“CSPs”).114 CSPs collect CDRs 
for customer billing and systems management purposes.115 These 
records are generated and maintained in the usual and ordinary course 
of business, and were introduced through witnesses from the CSPs 
who could explain the record-keeping process.116 Since all CDRs are 
“without further analysis largely unintelligible,”117 the Prosecution 
extracted the relevant information and entered it into what it terms 
“call sequence tables” to make the raw data capable of presentation 
and analysis without altering it.118 The call sequence tables are 
chronological sequences of calls to or from a specific number over a 
specified period of time, organized by the Prosecution for forensic 
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analysis.119 The call sequence tables were introduced through OTP 
analysts. Additionally, the Prosecution has called telecommunications 
experts to explain how cellular signal and cell tower sites are used to 
geolocate the cell phone user. The amount of witnesses and hours of 
testimony required to authenticate and understand the relevance and 
probative value of the telecommunications evidence is significant, 
because it refutes the notion that using this type of technologically 
derived evidence would be more efficient than eyewitnesses. At the 
same time, these witnesses are arguably at a lower security risk than 
victims and eyewitnesses. 
In his opening statement, the Prosecutor explained, “the 
evidence demonstrating the identities of the Accused is, to a large 
extent, dependent on the variety of tools they themselves used – the 
telephones.”120 He further stated that witness testimony, documents, 
contacts made to other phones, geolocation of the phones and SMS 
content place the phones used for aiding and abetting the crimes in the 
hands of the accused. The Prosecution alleged that the interconnected 
mobile telephone networks were involved in planning, preparing, and 
executing the attack. The Prosecution alleged that the Accused took 
considerable steps to use the telephones in a covert manner and under 
false names or no names, which showed that they were aware of the 
risk that telephone use could reveal their identity and their 
activities.121 However, they did not account for everything that 
investigators would be able to pull out of the metadata, such as their 
use of these covert network telephones in conjunction with the use of 
other telephones in their possession. The data showed that one of the 
accused, Badreddine, carried both his operational phone used for 
plotting Hariri’s assassination in one pocket and his personal phone 
used to call his girlfriends in the other.122 Two of the other accused, 
Oneissi and Sabra, used their covert network telephones for personal 
matters. With the application of logic, investigators were able to 
derive deep insights into the persons involved in the attack. The cost 
of the mobile phones used in the operation provided information 
about the group’s resources, and the pattern of calls revealed the 
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hierarchical command structure. The defense teams in this case have 
had the difficult task of pioneering how best to challenge this type of 
evidence without the resources of the Prosecution. They have had to 
employ their own experts and find ways to poke holes in the 
assumptions and conclusions drawn from the data, as well as question 
the data itself. One particular challenge that has come up on cross 
examination is the accuracy of using cell tower signals to predict a 
user’s physical location. The way cellular signals work is not 
necessarily precise or predicable, and the defense teams have had 
some success at demonstrating this through questioning of the 
Prosecution’s experts. Since this case is ongoing as of the time of 
writing, there is no judgment and no way to know what weight the 
judges will attribute to this evidence; but since this evidence is the 
crux of the Prosecution’s case, there will not be a conviction unless 
the judges accept the authenticity, relevance, and probative value of 
the telecommunications evidence and related findings. 
B. Evidence of crimes against cultural heritage 
The next case, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, also involves many firsts 
for international criminal justice. The Accused is the first at the ICC 
affiliated with an Islamic terrorist group, the first at the ICC to be 
charged with the war crime of destroying cultural property, and the 
first to plead guilty before the ICC.123 This case is one of the fastest to 
move through the stages of proceedings, with the issuance of an arrest 
warrant, confirmation of charges, and trial all within about a year 
period. The attacks on ten cultural heritage sites upon which the case 
is based took place in Mali in June and July 2012–a time and place 
where mobile phone and social media use was growing.124 The 
investigation began in 2013, which led to the issuance of an arrest 
warrant and immediate arrest of the Accused in September 2015. 
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After the confirmation of charges, the Accused pled guilty. A year 
later, a three-day trial took place from August 22-24, 2016. 
1. Case Background 
In early 2012, an internal armed conflict broke out in northern 
Mali and, within a few months, Islamist militants groups Ansar Dine 
and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb overtook Timbuktu.125 Al 
Mahdi was appointed to lead Ansar Dine’s morality brigade, Hesbah, 
which was entrusted with suppressing anything perceived to 
constitute “visible vice.”126 Timbuktu’s mausoleums and mosques 
were an integral part of the religious life of its inhabitants, a part of 
their common heritage, and a perceived threat to Ansar Dine. In June 
2012, the Ansar Dine leadership destroyed these cultural sites with Al 
Mahdi overseeing the effort. On July 18, 2012, the Malian 
Government referred “the Situation in Mali since January 2012” to 
the ICC pursuant to Article 53 of the Statute.127 In January 2013, the 
Prosecutor opened an official investigation. After nearly three years 
of investigations into the situation in Mali, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
issued an arrest warrant for Al Mahdi and he was swiftly transported 
to the seat of the Court in The Hague, where he was charged with 
intentionally directing attacks against ten buildings of a religious and 
historical character in Timbuktu on or around June and July 2012.128 
Due to the overwhelming evidence against him, Al Mahdi 
admitted guilt. However, because the ICC does not have a full plea-
bargaining scheme as in countries like the United States, the 
Prosecution was nevertheless required to present some evidence 
against the Accused to corroborate the admission. During a three-day 
trial, which opened with Al Mahdi’s statement, the Prosecutor 
presented the main evidence in its case. To assess whether Al Mahdi’s 
admission of guilt was supported by the facts of the case pursuant to 
Article 65(1)(c) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber heard three 
witnesses and considered over seven hundred items of documentary 
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/CR2016_07244.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z4BC-AGX9] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
126. Id. at ¶¶ 31 & 33. 
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evidence.129 The Prosecution’s evidence against Al Mahdi included 
documents and witness statements, as well as satellite images from 
before and after the destruction; archive photographs taken at 
different times; audio recordings found on the internet containing 
statements from members of armed groups; video recordings on the 
internet which show the destruction at the time of the attack; a 
geolocation report from an expert witness, which made it possible to 
“locate with certainty” each video with regard to a precise 
mausoleum; an expert report ascribing dates and a time frame to the 
videos; 360-degree panoramic photographs; and scientific police 
reports which have been carried out on the scenes of destruction by 
ICC teams.130 The evidence was agreed upon by the parties and 
therefore not challenged by the Defense. As the Senior Trial Lawyer 
explained in his opening statement:  
In view of the guilty plea entered, the public must understand, 
therefore, today that the Prosecution does not intend to deal with 
each of the 700 pieces of evidence that have been filed before the 
Court, we will deal only with specific aspects; namely, starting 
with an interactive platform, the Prosecution will use satellite 
images, photographs, videos and other materials gleaned from the 
Internet which are included on the list of our evidence material to 
show the situation of the mausoleums before, during and after the 
destruction, including the participation of the accused.131  
The Chamber issued its verdict a month after the trial, finding beyond 
reasonable doubt that the admission of guilt, together with the 
additional evidence, satisfied the essential facts to prove the alleged 
crimes and sentenced Al Mahdi to nine years. 132 
2. Open Source Evidence 
Of particular note in the Al Mahdi case was the amount of open 
source evidence presented, including satellite images from Google 
Earth, videos from YouTube, and audio clips found on the internet. 
Open source evidence is information collected from publicly available 
                                                 
129. Id. at ¶ 29 (714 items of documentary evidence). 
130. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, Transcript, 28-
29 (Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Al Mahdi, Opening Transcript], https://www.icc-cpi.int/
Transcripts/CR2016_05767.PDF [https://perma.cc/6AEN-9DFL] (archived Dec. 29, 2017). 
131. Id. at  41. 
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sources for trial purposes.133 Since the conflict occurred in 2012, a 
time when use of mobile phones, digital cameras, satellites and drones 
were pervasive, even in a locality as remote as Timbuktu, the criminal 
acts, resulting damage, and intent of the parties were well 
documented. Ansar Dine, a terrorist group who, like many others, 
skillfully utilized modern technologies as part of their recruitment 
strategy and aggression tactics, deliberately made public statements 
explaining their intent and reasoning for destroying the mosques and 
mausoleums. Al Mahdi himself agreed to be interviewed by the press 
and allowed journalists to video record his team taking 
sledgehammers to the buildings. These video recordings were 
broadcast on television and some were uploaded onto the internet. At 
the same time, Timbuktu residents, in an effort to memorialize their 
cultural heritage and its razing, either with the hope of accountability 
for the perpetrators or for future reconstruction efforts, used their own 
hand-held devices to record the destruction and they too shared that 
footage with the world by uploading the videos to public websites.134 
As part of their investigation, OTP investigators scoured the internet 
for relevant information from their desks in The Hague. This allowed 
the investigation to progress even at times when the unpredictable 
security situation in Mali prevented their physical presence. The 
videos served as tools for identifying the buildings and their locations, 
pinpointing locations the investigators should visit as part of their due 
diligence, as well as ascertaining the identities of the perpetrators and 
potential witnesses who investigators should locate and interview. 
Thus, the open source information helped investigators run a more 
efficient and targeted investigation. 
The Defense did not challenge the authenticity of the videos, 
agreeing to their admission as part of the terms of the guilty plea. 
Therefore, the Chamber was not forced to rule on their 
admissibility.135 The Chamber could have required a higher threshold 
for the Prosecution to admit these items, but did not do so in this case. 
Open source derived information, such as social media videos, has yet 
to be intensely challenged as evidence in an international courtroom. 
For the YouTube videos and publicly available digital images found 
on the internet, the Prosecution used internal investigators to verify 
                                                 
133. Alexa Koenig, Felim McMahon, and Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee, Open Source 
Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations, CILRAP (forthcoming 2018). 
134. See generally Al Mahdi, Judgment. 
135. See generally id. 
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the authenticity of the images by geolocating the landmarks in the 
images.136 While the Prosecution made an effort to geolocate some of 
the open source videos and photographs, limited forensic analysis was 
admitted alongside. To authenticate and verify open source videos, 
investigators must determine whether or not they are fake. Videos 
may be considered “fake” or inauthentic for a number of reasons – 
they could be doctored, staged, or misleading or attached to 
misinformation.137 In this case, the Prosecution focused on 
ascertaining the date, time and location, but did not show concern that 
the images and videos may be doctored or staged. In sticking with the 
standard from the ICTY, without any indication of fraud, the 
Prosecution need not take extra steps to verify that an image has not 
been falsified. 
In addition to videos and images taken by persons on the ground, 
the Prosecution also relied on satellite images found on Google Earth. 
While the images were not challenged in this case, it is important to 
note some of the legal issues that may have been raised if the Defense 
had offered a challenge. In fact, there exist valid grounds upon which 
to challenge the admission of Google Earth images, particularly in the 
format presented by the Prosecution—a screenshot. The Prosecution 
was not required to take the additional step of seeking out the raw 
images from Google, question employees of Google Earth about their 
process, or verify on the ground the accuracy of the satellites used by 
Google Earth in that location and time. This is problematic because 
Google Earth positional accuracy is not fixed but varies from one 
time to another.138 Variations may be the result of the process by 
which Google Earth updates its images, which involves periodically 
replacing old images with more recent or better resolution images.139 
The three-dimensional mapping that Google Earth uses takes flat 
images and shapes them onto sphere, essentially creating a patch 
work quilt of images that are stretched and sewn together to create the 
                                                 
136. See Elliot Higgins, A Beginner’s Guide to Geolocating Videos, BELLINGCAT (July 
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geolocation/ [https://perma.cc/N3C5-G5S4] (archived Dec. 29, 2017) (Geolocation is the 
identification of the real life geographic location of a person, building, object, signal, or event. 
It often involves the analysis of visual information in an image along with any available 
metadata in order to match those visual cues and data with a confirmed location).  
137. Nikita Mehandru and Alexa Koenig, Open Source Intelligence and its Use in 
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seamless scrolling function.140 Since Google Earth was not made for 
the courtroom and is not required to be forensically sound, there are a 
number of variables that could impact the reliability of these images. 
The reliability of Google Earth images and the extracted positional 
data should be supported with field checks of the locations and 
corroborated with other evidence. Additionally, it would be best 
practice to acquire the original images directly from the source rather 
than taking screenshots because it is more reliable to uncover 
potential tampering with the primary image file. The unchallenged 
admission in this case of Google Earth images will not bar future 
challenges in other cases, but it may cause everyone from activists to 
criminal investigators to rely on this type of material when they 
should be taking a more critical stance against its admission as 
evidence. 
3. Interactive Digital Platform 
In addition to the source of the digital evidence in this case, the 
way it was presented is also noteworthy. In addition to mining 
photographs, satellite imagery, and video footage from the internet, 
the Prosecution sent a team to Timbuktu to produce their own images 
of the area.141 They used specialized technology to create 360-degree 
visuals. The imagery from all sources was compiled and used to 
create an interactive platform presentation.142 The platform was 
presented to the judges by the senior trial lawyer during his opening 
statement and then submitted to the Trial Chamber as evidence so that 
the judges could further explore the interactive platform in their own 
time. The creators of the platform were not called to testify to their 
process or methodology even though they handled the evidence. The 
senior trial lawyer explained that this interactive platform allowed the 
Prosecution to provide an optimal presentation of the various videos 
that were found on the internet.143 Because they were dealing with so 
many different locations, the interactive platform presentation assisted 
the judges in seeing what occurred at each and every one of the 
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relevant locations.144 This platform was demonstrative, so even 
though it was admitted as a separate item of evidence in addition to its 
individual components (i.e., images and videos), it was not 
necessarily attributed with evidentiary value. Demonstrative evidence, 
which includes diagrams, maps, drawings, graphs, animation, 
simulations, and models, is information to help the judges better 
understand the evidence, not evidence per se. While it was not an 
issue in this case because of the guilty plea, intentional or inadvertent 
bias in the presentation of these type of demonstrative visual 
representations raise significant fair trial issues, as does the exorbitant 
cost of creating such intricate presentation tools.145 This platform was 
far more sophisticated than the visual representation created of the 
Institut of Bogoro in 2009. The interactivity of the platform is 
interesting, as it forces judges to engage with the evidence rather than 
being passive observers, which is a new development. Lawyers 
should be paying attention to the advantages that come with new 
digital tools for presenting evidence at trial while at the same time 
remaining wary of any potential biases in the software.146 
C. Evidence of offenses against the administration of justice 
The final case, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al, is, again, a case of 
firsts for the International Criminal Court.147 It is the first case 
involving the charge of offenses against the administration of 
justice.148 It is also the first investigation to use an anonymous 
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informant as a source of information, the first ICC case to use 
financial transactions as evidence, and the first case addressing 
important legal issues regarding attorney-client privilege and the right 
to privacy. Due to the nature of the charges, it was also a shorter 
investigation and trial than the majority of cases that preceded it. 
Before providing the case background, however, it is important to 
understand this case’s relationship to another case, Prosecutor v. Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo (“Bemba” or “Main Case”), since the two are 
inherently linked. 
1. Brief overview of the Main Case 
During 2002-2003, an armed conflict took place in the Central 
African Republic between the Central African governmental 
authorities, supported by the MLC, and an organized armed group of 
rebels led by General Bozize.149 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a 
Congolese citizen, was the MLC President and Commander-in-Chief 
of the ALC, the organization’s figurehead, and source of its funding, 
goals and aims. During the conflict, MLC soldiers directed 
widespread attacks against the civilian population under Bemba’s 
command.150 In May 2007, the Office of the Prosecutor, at the request 
of the Government of the Central African Republic (CAR), launched 
an investigation concerning the crimes alleged to have been 
committed in CAR.151 A little over a year later, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
issued an arrest warrant for Bemba who was residing in Belgium 
where he was arrested. Bemba was subsequently transferred to The 
Hague and charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity 
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under the principle of command responsibility.152 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber also issued a decision to request the identification, tracing, 
freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Bemba by national 
authorities.153 Charges against Bemba were confirmed in June 2009 
and the trial opened on November 22, 2010. While the trial was 
ongoing, the Office of the Prosecutor received an anonymous email 
providing information concerning an alleged witness bribery scheme 
orchestrated by Bemba and his defense council to influence the 
testimony of witnesses against Bemba.154 This email tip is where the 
second case, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al (“Bemba et al” or “Article 70 
Case”) begins.155 
2. Case Background 
The anonymous tip launched a new investigation into the 
interference with witnesses in the Main Case, which proceeded while 
the first trial was still in progress.156 Due to the nature of the second 
case, there is no public decision regarding the opening of an official 
Article 70 investigation, but it is known that the investigation began 
while the Prosecution was still presenting its case-in-chief. There 
were essentially three main prongs to this investigation – surveillance 
of email and telephone communications, “following the money,” and 
getting cooperation from the scheme’s insiders – which resulted in a 
high amount of non-testimonial evidence.157 In many ways this 
investigation was more akin to a national public corruption case than 
a traditional international criminal justice case. Finding that there was 
truth to the allegation, and after collecting evidence with the help of 
national law enforcement partners, the Prosecution submitted an 
application in November 2013 for an arrest warrant against Bemba, 
his lawyer Kilolo, and three others for their involvement in the crime 
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of witness interference.158 It is significant that these allegations were 
pursued and made it to trial, since there had been issues in almost all 
previous cases with witness interference, including cases from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Cote d’Ivoire. The 
closing statements in the Main Case were given on November 12, 
2014.159 The verdict was still outstanding when the second trial for 
the Article 70 case opened on September 29, 2015. In Bemba et al, 
the Prosecution introduced a high number of items of non-oral 
evidence, including evidence documenting money transfers through 
Western Union provided by the Austrian authorities, and evidence of 
telephone communications provided by Dutch authorities and the ICC 
Detention Centre.160 The Defense challenged the admissibility of the 
Western Union Documents, the provenance of recorded and 
intercepted telephone calls, text messages (SMS), and emails on a 
number of grounds including improper procedure in their collection 
and violation of the Accused’s right to privacy.161 The Chamber 
admitted the evidence, but provided valuable reasoning explaining the 
importance of the right to privacy when considering the admission of 
these sorts of materials.162 
3. Digital Financial Evidence 
Financial investigations are not new, but are growing in 
importance for all sorts of criminal investigations in national and 
international jurisdictions, particularly those involving corruption. A 
wire transfer is a method of moving electronic funds from one person 
or entity to another, a service that began with the establishment of the 
first Western Union in 1872. The first online banking services started 
in New York in the 1980s, but were not offered to the public through 
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mobile devices until 1999.163 Technology facilitating the transfer and 
exchange of money is one that, while always evolving, has undergone 
substantial development since the invention of smart phones after 
2010.164 Rather than giving cash bribes, the Accused in this case used 
Western Union to transfer funds, which created a record and, in turn, 
irrefutable evidence of the transactions. 
To prove the money transfers between the accused and the 
witnesses the Prosecution presented financial records (“Western 
Union Documents”) provided by the Austrian authorities. These 
records listed money transfers effected through Western Union that 
indicate the sender’s name, the amount, the date and time of the 
transfer, the sender’s telephone number, as well as the name and 
telephone number of the recipient and the date and time on which the 
money was collected. The Defense never challenged the reliability 
and accuracy of the information contained in these records, but 
objected to their admissibility under Article 69(7) of the Statute on 
the grounds that they were obtained in breach of national laws and the 
internationally recognized human right to privacy of the accused.165 
The defense teams filed a joint request to declare the Western Union 
Documents inadmissible, submitting that due to the specific 
circumstances in which the Western Union Documents were 
collected, their admission into evidence would be antithetical to and 
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings in the sense 
of Article 69(7)(b) of the Statute.166 The Chamber decided to rule on 
the application for exclusion of this particular evidence during trial as 
an exception to the decision to defer its assessment of the 
admissibility of evidence until deliberating its judgment.167 The 
Chamber rejected these objections, yet declared that the right to 
privacy is an internationally recognized human right.168 The Chamber 
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explained that the right to privacy includes financial information such 
as data kept by banks and, by extension, by financial service 
companies such as Western Union, and affirmed that the right to 
privacy is one that may not be interfered with except “in accordance 
with the law.”169 Thus, procedural safeguards are necessary before 
investigators can seize such materials. Based on the facts of this case, 
the Chamber concluded that the measures taken by the authorities 
were in fact governed by the Statute and the Rules since proper 
procedural safeguards were in place.170 The Chamber formally 
submitted the financial records emanating from Western Union during 
trial171 and heard testimony from a Western Union representative who 
served as the Prosecution’s point of contact.172 The Chamber relied on 
the Western Union Documents primarily to corroborate other 
evidence concerning payments, in particular witness testimonies.173 
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4. Telecommunications and Intercept Evidence 
The telephone communications evidence presented in Bemba et 
al included both call data records with metadata regarding the 
telephone use, as well as intercepts with the content of the 
communications between parties introduced as digital audio-
recordings. As in Ayyash et al, the Prosecution presented a series of 
‘call sequence tables’ indicating the date, numbers involved and the 
source from which the information was collected in order to prove 
communications among the accused or between the accused and 
witnesses.174 The attribution of the telephone numbers to the 
individuals concerned was demonstrated by indicating the number 
and the name. The contacts between particular individuals were set 
out in chronological order. 
One difference from the use of telecommunications evidence in 
Ayyash et al is that this case focused on the numbers and frequency of 
contacts, and did not use any geolocation data. The call data records 
were introduced through bar table motion, and no employee of the 
communications service provider was required to testify.175 What this 
example indicates, perhaps, is that the defense may be more willing to 
accept metadata about numbers and frequency of calls from CSPs, but 
will want to challenge the technology used to geolocate users based 
on signals to cell tower sites since there is more room for 
interpretation in the way this is done by experts. 
An analyst from the Office of the Prosecutor, who was 
responsible for preparing the call sequence tables, testified in court. In 
addition to the tables, the Prosecution presented call data records 
(‘CDRs’) of national, private telecommunication companies.176 The 
Prosecution also introduced expert testimony on the CDR.177 Where 
national authorities intercepted communications, audio recordings, 
together with corresponding call logs, were submitted. 
Finally, the Prosecution presented call logs and audio recordings 
emanating from incoming and outgoing communications from the 
ICC Detention Centre between Bemba and others.178 One issue that 
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came up with the recordings from the detention center was that the 
two sides of the call were separated. Therefore, an analyst had to edit 
together a cohesive conversation in order for it to make sense. The 
Defense challenged this, but the Chamber was not persuaded by their 
argument that the recording was unreliable. The Chamber was able to 
apply common sense and logic to understand the conversation came 
together and were conscious of any shortcomings. 
The Defense objected to the use of these communications and 
corresponding logs on grounds that the Prosecution had failed to 
sufficiently establish their authenticity and chain of custody and that 
the Prosecution did not call a witness to authenticate recordings or 
intercepted communications.179 The Chamber did not buy this 
argument because there was an “array of mutually reinforcing 
information confirming the accuracy of the intercepted 
communications and their corresponding logs.”180 The Chamber 
further noted that some communications and logs had inherent indicia 
of authenticity such as corporate watermarks of the 
telecommunications provider.181 It is significant to note that the 
Chamber did its own analysis rather than taking the Prosecution’s 
word. According to its judgment in the case, the Trial Chamber did its 
own verification in order to confirm the Prosecutor’s findings. “When 
determining the relevant details of the telephone communications, 
such as the speakers, relevant numbers and the date of the call, the 
Chamber has conducted its own independent assessment of the 
evidence.”182 Seeing the judges making an effort to engage with the 
evidence is a positive sign. Similar to the Al Mahdi case, the digital 
evidence enabled the judges to take a more active role in examining 
and engaging with the evidence. 
5. Digital Communications Evidence 
During the investigation, the prosecutor’s office confiscated 
Bemba’s laptop and cellular phone in the Detention Center and 
extracted emails and other digital documents. The Prosecution 
introduced into evidence an email from one of the accused, Arido, to 
one of the witnesses in which he cautioned the witness about using 
social media, stating that they should communicate outside 
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“facebook”.183 The Defense argued that the Prosecution had not 
provided sufficient information concerning the provenance or 
attribution of the emails it wished to admit, and therefore should be 
excluded. Further, the Defense argued that the contents of these 
emails revealed no impropriety, stating that it was “highly concerning 
that the Prosecution sought to infer wrongful conduct from a caution 
to witnesses to avoid using Facebook,
 
when such a caution is required 
by ICC best practices for witness protection.”184 
Despite cautions not to use Facebook, the investigators found 
evidence on Facebook in the form of four photographs that were used 
to link individuals and corroborate other evidence. The four 
photographs were allegedly extracted from the Facebook pages of a 
defense witness and a prosecution witness. The defense argued that 
the photos were not prima facie authentic or reliable “because the 
Prosecution provided no material supporting the attribution of the 
Facebook pages.”  Since the creation of a Facebook account does not 
require valid and verifiable identification, the defense argued that it 
was not possible to ascertain that a Facebook account under a certain 
name is attributable to that person.185 The prosecution argued that 
they are prima facie reliable and authentic. In its final judgment, the 
Trial Chamber did not address these photographs from Facebook, 
giving no clear ruling either way. This is likely because the facts that 
photos were submitted to prove was proved through other evidence, 
such as witness testimony admitting that a relationship between the 
individuals pictured existed. The Chamber did not need to address the 
admissibility of these photos, since they were not relevant to its 
decision, thus kicking the can down the line to future Chambers to 
decide on the admissibility of social media photos, perhaps in a case 
where they play a more significant role in directly proving the 
elements of the crimes. While this case did not provide jurisprudence 
on the admissibility of social media photo or answer questions on 
how investigators and lawyers should view this sort of information 
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(i.e., as lead information only, for corroboration, or as direct 
evidence), it is likely that those answers will come very soon. As 
discussed in the next Part, the international criminal cases on the 
horizon involve significantly more of these newer types of evidence.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF EVIDENCE IN WAR CRIMES 
PROSECUTIONS 
The cases in Part III suggest that digital technologies are 
profoundly changing international criminal investigations and 
prosecutions in two distinct ways: (1) the data and digital information 
produced by the use of digital devices has created a new and fruitful 
body of potential evidence; and (2) new technologies are changing the 
landscape of evidence presentation. In looking towards future cases, it 
is clear that digital evidence will be increasingly relied upon, which 
means prosecutors, investigators, defense attorneys, and judges all 
need to be prepared. 
As of this writing, there are three trials underway at the ICC – 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, and Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen.186 These cases 
all deal with crimes committed before 2012, and thus at a time when 
digital communication, especially over social media, was less 
prevalent than it is today, and when investigators had less access to 
remote sensing technologies. There are currently no other accused 
persons in custody in The Hague, and so there is no trial on deck. 
However, the ICC website lists that there are open investigations in 
ten countries and preliminary examinations in ten other countries.187 
When considering the potential for digital evidence in some of the 
preliminary examinations, there are a few notable situations, such as 
conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan are marked, in particular, by the expansive use of drone 
technologies for both surveillance and weaponry.188 In the past, covert 
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surveillance would have to be conducted by a person on the ground, 
forced to keep a low profile due to the risk of detection and security 
concerns. This placed a high burden and responsibility on the 
surveilling individual to make decisions based on the apparently 
available information. If actions were taken, that person’s testimony 
would serve as the primary evidence. With the use of drones, which 
can surveil targets from above with little risk of detection, multiple 
investigators or officers in the military can watch the same feed and 
conduct surveillance without increasing the risk of detection.189 
Drones can go where humans cannot, and high-resolution telephoto 
lenses on drones can magnify the images, giving investigators a closer 
look.190 When drones are used in this manner, they are not simply 
providing a live feed, but also creating a digital record of the footage 
that can be reviewed later or even used as evidence in court. In 
modern conflict zones, military are equipped with a variety of digital 
devices providing information about their movements on the ground. 
In addition, civilians in and around conflict zones have cell phones. 
Between the satellites monitoring of a situation from space, drones 
observing the situation from above, and persons recording the 
situation on the ground, there is enough imagery and footage to 
portray modern conflict situations from all angles and at all times. If 
judges need to assess whether certain actions taken by investigators or 
officers in the military were reasonable based on the information 
available to them, they can review the drone or cell phone footage 
rather than relying on testimony. 
Another conflict situation for which there is likely to be 
significant evidence and leads provided for in the digital or cyber 
space is Ukraine, a conflict in which Russian is potentially 
implicated.191 While there is not much information on the ICC’s 
preliminary examination, which focuses on the alleged crimes 
committed in the context of the “Maidan” protests since November 
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21, 2013 and other events in Ukraine since February 2014,192 there is 
another investigation related to Ukraine, which may provide some 
insights into what can be expected for the ICC’s investigation. On 
July 27, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to 
Kuala Lumpur crashed in eastern Ukraine.193 196 Dutch nationals 
were among the 298 passengers and crewmembers.194 In response, a 
Joint Investigative Team (JIT) was created to look into the incident 
and identify those responsible.195 While this case has not yet gone to 
trial, much of the evidence and findings of the investigation have been 
published, attributing responsibility to Russia. In the presentation of 
their findings, they refer to significant quantities and types of digital 
evidence use in the investigation including Facebook profiles, chat 
room conversation, cell phone photos, street view images, cell phone 
videos uploaded to the internet and other open source information, 
telecom data and telephone wiretaps, and a geographic information 
system to capture, store, manipulate, analyze, manage, and present 
relevant geospatial data. The presentation, which can be found online, 
is slick and compelling, showing how they linked all the information, 
much of which was publicly available together.196 The MH17 
investigation, while not a case involving Rome Statute crimes, is a 
perfect example of what lawyers and judges can expect to see in the 
courtroom in the near future. 
On August 15, 2017, the ICC released a new public arrest 
warrant in the Situation in Libya against Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf 
Al-Werfalli based in large part on videos of executions found on 
social media websites.197 International criminal justice has seen the 
first “documentary trial” at Nuremberg, the “media case” at the ICTR, 
and the “cell phone case” at the STL. With this new arrest warrant, 
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there is now the first “social media case”. In fact, initial blog posts 
and commentaries on the Al-Werfalli arrest warrant are already 
dubbing it as such.198 Talking about technology and digital evidence 
in war crimes prosecutions is no longer a forecast or a hypothetical. It 
is here. 
In addition to the docket at the ICC, there are current conflicts 
beyond the ICC’s reach that may nevertheless end up litigated in an 
international tribunal. The most prominent of these is Syria. The 
conflict in Syria has been referred to as the “crisis of our generation,” 
and the international justice community has kept a watchful eye on it 
for years. The ICC does not have jurisdiction over this conflict.199 
However, that has not stopped international investigators and lawyers 
from outside the ICC from taking action. A number of organizations 
such as the Syrian Archive and the Commission for International 
Justice and Accountability (“CIJA”) have engaged in evidence 
collection, even though there is not yet a forum to receive that 
evidence for prosecution.200 CIJA has used willing activists to 
smuggle over 50,000 photos and documents out of Syria. The Syrian 
Archive has been collecting and preserving social media videos and 
other online content documenting the conflict. The mass flow of 
information is a defining characteristic of the war in Syrian. Citizen 
journalism has exploded in the Middle East as a way to counter 
oppressive regimes and, as a result, there is a vast amount of relevant 
open source content available. How to channel the mass information 
available into a court of law in order to get accountability is a 
problem that needs solving. In December 2016, the United Nations 
Security Council passed a resolution to establish a new International, 
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Impartial and Independent Mechanism (“IIIM”) to collect and analyze 
evidence of mass atrocities and human rights violations in Syria. 
While the Mechanism will not have the power to prosecute cases, its 
creation brings the international community a step closer to justice. 
The conflict in Syria is the most documented conflict in history, with 
more hours of video footage of the conflict than the conflict itself.201 
The Libya and Syria cases demonstrate that Ayyash et al, Al Mahdi, 
and Bemba et al are not anomalies or temporary deviations, but rather 
the first in a growing trend. 
A. Considerations for international criminal law practitioners 
The amount of available data will grow exponentially with 
increased connectivity and integration of portable electronics.202 This 
is a blessing but also a curse because the sheer quantity has the 
potential to overload investigative resources and create an 
unmanageable digital evidence backlog.203 With constant changes in 
technology, international investigators and prosecutors must 
continually adapt their policies and practices to address novel legal 
issues involving digital evidence. International criminal investigators, 
lawyers, and judges must be constantly learning to stay up to date 
with new technologies and devices, as well as developments in how 
existing technologies are being used and adapted.204 
The near universal adoption and technical improvements of cell 
phones, coupled with the faster change and development of 
technology itself have at the same time increased uncertainty. The 
positive aspect for international criminal lawyers is that they are 
accustomed to uncertainty, since the international criminal legal field 
has always presented, in many ways, an uncertain terrain. The ICC 
can both learn from and contribute to the understanding and use of 
digital evidence in national jurisdictions. New types of digital 
evidence and technologically produced and stored data are valuable to 
court proceedings, but may require modified standards for 
admissibility in order to protect the fairness of proceedings and the 
interests of justice. Difficult issues will almost certainly have to be 
confronted, especially those concerning rights of privacy.  Bemba et 
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al. was just the first such case.  Privacy concerns are far greater and 
more salient with digital evidence than with analog evidence.205 
Ensuring that parties and judges fully understand how digital 
evidence is authenticated and verified may require laborious 
testimony from experts. Digital tools for presentation of evidence, 
while effective, will need a closer and more critical look into their 
potential for bias and issues of equality. 
Major developments in the information technology landscape 
over the past two decades have made the collection and analysis of 
digital evidence an increasingly important tool for solving crimes and 
preparing court cases. The ability of lawyers and judges to embrace 
these new types of evidence and understand these new technologies 
may ultimately determine whether international criminal justice is 
here to stay. 
Digital evidence exploitation is a skill all investigators should 
have and all criminal lawyers should understand. While it is 
undeniable that these new types of evidence are useful and will 
inevitably make their way into the courtroom, their introduction 
should be deliberate, educated, and cautious. Thus, there are three 
issues of which to stay particularly vigilant: the fairness of 
proceedings, the equality of arms, and the balancing of resources. 
Open source investigations are cheap but the evidentiary value of this 
material is still considered low, while other investigative methods 
such as forensic missions might lead to probative evidence, but at a 
prohibitively high cost. It will be essential for the fairness of 
proceedings for the Prosecution to involve the defense earlier in the 
process and analysis of raw data. 
Past articles that have been written on digital evidence in 
national or international jurisdictions share similar recommendations 
about creating standards and providing additional training. While 
these are constructive recommendations, they fail to address the rapid 
rate of change in digital technology. The speed of growth and change 
is itself accelerating, and lawyers and investigators need to be more 
agile than ever to stay current. By the time standard operating 
procedures are created for handling digital evidence in its present 
state and relevant actors are trained on existing technologies, there 
will already be a new backlog of issues and challenges to address. 
Instead of being reactionary, lawyers and investigators need to get 
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ahead of the curve and will have to look towards the future and think 
about how they themselves can innovate and utilize new technologies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In examining the Prosecution’s evidence in the three case 
examples above, one thing is clear: witness testimony is no longer the 
only critical body of proof. In Ayyash et al, the defendants were 
identified through their use of cellular phones in the planning and 
preparation of the attack on Beirut. In Al Mahdi, the defendant was 
identified through video footage for which he willingly posed and 
which he himself posted to social media as propaganda and promotion 
of Ansar Dine’s attack on cultural heritage sites in Timbuktu. In 
Bemba et al, the defendants were identified through their use of 
cellular phones and emails to communicate and the wire transfers 
made to supply the funds to carry out their crimes. In all three cases it 
was the technological tools that the accused themselves used to 
facilitate their criminal activities that allowed investigators to identify 
them and created the evidence used by prosecutors to prove their 
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Investigators and prosecutors do 
not get to determine what evidence is available for them to collect and 
use – the criminals do. As long as criminals are operating in the 
modern world and relying on technology to facilitate their criminal 
conduct, evidence of their crimes will inevitably be, to some extent, 
digitally recorded. 
The arena in which technology, international human rights, and 
criminal prosecution intersect is new and growing. The first 
international cases dealing with digital evidence have come to trial in 
the last few years, which marks the beginning of what will soon be 
the norm for international criminal cases. This topic can no longer be 
thought of as an area of specialization for which one knowledgeable 
individual is brought into court because he or she possesses the 
requisite area of expertise. Just as the investigators, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys and judges at Nuremberg, the ad hoc tribunals, the 
hybrid tribunals and the ICC had to become experts in how to collect, 
preserve, and present documents, physical evidence, and forensic 
expert reports for past cases, all practitioners in the international 
criminal justice field should be enhancing their technical 
understanding of new digital technologies and should be cultivating a 
deeper social understanding of how social media and other digital 
communications are being used in conflict zones. 
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